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Abstract: Calls for taking up wisdom in its place risk re-inscribing colo-
niality at the level of signification if attempts to resituate intelligibility in 
the specificity of place are not enacted through a careful translation of ex-
perience between victims and perpetrators of colonial violence. At some 
level, decolonization ought to be conceived as a kind of translation. Em-
manuel Levinas’ project to “translate” Judaism into Greek is one way of 
staging such decolonial translation by providing us an internal critique of 
coloniality while remaining receptive to indigenous inspirations that enrich 
eco-phenomenological ways of encountering place. In the final instance, 
however, this paper calls for encountering place through the indigenous 
languages that make place ethically legible. 
How much
for your grief
your father’s sisters are revealing their faces.
. . .
Yes
how much it is
as if they’re revealing their faces is how I’m thinking about them,
your sisters-in-law.
Yes,
They are revealing their faces.
— Jessie Dalton, “Speech for the Removal of Grief”
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[Responsibility] is an openness of which respiration is a modality 
or a foretaste, or, more exactly, of which it retains the aftertaste. 
Outside of any mysticism, in this respiration, the possibility of every 
sacrifice for the other, activity and passivity coincide.
— Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being
I do not know your language though I hear the breaking of 
waves through the vowels.
— Joy Harjo, “Protocol” (from How We Became Human)
PROLOGUE: WHEN SPEAKING HEALING WORDS IS NOT ENOUGH
In Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma, Gabriele 
Schwab asks, “How does one think about cultural belonging from the perspec-
tive of the victims of colonization, on the one hand, and of the descendants 
of perpetrator nations, on the other hand?” (98). Contending with transgen-
erational transmission of trauma born of genocide and colonial violences—in 
their myriad cultural, linguistic, psychological, and somatic dimensions—
Schwab argues, “We have arrived at a place in history where we can no longer 
afford to deal with the histories of victims and perpetrators in isolation” (82). 
The question for Schwab, which she shares with Simon Ortiz, is how can such 
a dialogue occur? Under what conditions would it be possible for descendants 
of victims and perpetrators of such violence to “translate” their experiences, 
especially when the circumstances of such “translation” are irrevocably con-
ditioned by centuries of moral, aesthetic, and cultural colonialism? Indeed, 
as Eric Cheyfitz’s work emphatically reminds us, the very word “translation” 
(trans latio, “across the oceans”) bears within it a colonial prejudice. “Speaking 
healing words” by itself, then, is not a solution—for, as Schwab notes, it might 
“obscure real political processing” even as it contributes to socio-psychic 
health. As such, it is precisely because of such dangers that we must address 
historical and traumatic violences across the cultural and ethnic boundaries 
that divide perpetrators and victims.
Concerned here with resituating the emergence of intelligibility in the 
specificity of place, of encountering wisdom in its place, this paper takes up 
Schwab’s question in the concrete localities of Lingít Aaní, Tlingít ancestral 
land, in Southeast Alaska where the main campus of the University of Alaska 
Southeast (UAS) is located. As UAS assumes an increasingly connected role in 
intensifying Lingít language revitalization, the hope to sustain (indeed, re-
vitalize) such discursive affirmation demands that decolonizing efforts must 
not only “reorient” philosophical reasoning but also must contribute to an 
open politics of acknowledgement of the violent histories of colonialism in Lingít 
Aaní and their contemporary expressions. As Schwab notes, without attending 
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to the “psychosocial deformation of the culture at large” under which such 
violence is still perpetrated, efforts to speak healing words risk further contrib-
uting to a politics of silence and denial (84). Thus, decolonizing efforts must 
occur at least on two registers: at the level of colonialism and at the level of 
coloniality, which survives colonialism in more invidious and subtle cultural 
expressions.
As Nelson Maldonado-Torres notes, developing a term coined by Walter 
Mignolo, coloniality, different from colonialism, “refers to long-standing pat-
terns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, 
labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the 
strict limits of colonial administrations” (243). Like a song that plays on long 
after the instrument is gone, coloniality is “maintained alive in books, in the 
criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in 
the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of 
our modern experience” (243). Using a vocabulary that will be important to 
these critical meditations, Maldonado-Torres notes that, in a way, “as modern 
subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and everyday” (243). While Cheyfitz 
and others have noted that there is nothing “post” about colonialism in the 
United States, rooting out the persistent sorrows of coloniality is the more 
difficult task at hand. With such difficulties and dangers in mind, this paper 
attempts to make one significant gesture toward “translating” experience 
between victims and perpetrators of historical violence on Lingít Aaní by 
borrowing from Emmanuel Levinas’s own “translation” attempts between 
“Judaism” and “Greek.” In terms of “reorienting philosophical reasoning,” I 
advocate for developing an “inspired” eco-phenomenology—one that works 
through an internal critique of the cultural logics and political economies that 
adumbrate the historical shapes of coloniality while, at the same time, remain-
ing open to a decolonizing effort that restores “the logics of the gift through a 
decolonial politics of receptive generosity” (Maldonado-Torres, 261).
For Levinas, the first movement of phenomenology is neither intention-
ality nor apprehension—but inspiration. Moreover, in Otherwise Than Being 
and elsewhere, Levinas links inspiration to revelation, the revelation of the 
face of the other, which opens an altogether different modality of time—a 
diachrony attuned to a “fundamental historicity,” one expressed in the “tran-
scendence of words” (story) that is, like ancestry, embodied but not reducible 
to flesh. Such an “inspired” eco-phenomenology accords well with “Lingít 
tundataani” (Tlingit thinking), which is born of this transcendence of words. 
The word “lingít” means “human”; however, Lingít tundataani requires more 
than a simple existing. It requires this “fundamental historicity” (diachrony 
as ancestry) and a “hearing the land speak,” which is always already storied 
and ecological in ways that cultures of usurpation are historically tone deaf 
toward. Only with Lingít tundataani does one “truly” become human, ex-
Sol Neely
pressed by the phrase, “Kunáx Lingít haa wustee” (We really have become 
human beings). The guiding political assumption here is that if reparation or 
restitution between (descendants of) victims and perpetrators of historical 
violences is ever to be effectuated, it will have to occur in accord with Lingít 
tundataani, with a politics and a pedagogy attuned to such discursive affirma-
tion, which a Levinasian “inspired” eco-phenomenology is uniquely suited 
to attend to as it poses an internal critique and unconditioning of the very 
coloniality of being that perpetuates and gives alibi to genocidal indifference 
and cultural unresponsiveness.
This paper proceeds in a series of two meditations that overlap and build 
upon each other like aphorisms. In accord with Levinas’s thinking of inspi-
ration in terms of the literalness of respiration, they are composed with the 
cadence of breath and attuned to the systole and diastole of the heart. Moreover, 
following the work of Martin Matuštík, I describe these meditations as “post-
secular”—which is to say that they adopt a quality of the literary, of story, that 
is historically abjected from philosophical projects still too beholden to spheres 
of intelligibility dominated, as Levinas writes in “Diachrony and Representa-
tion,” by vision, knowledge, and presence—of a thinking that embraces and 
perceives all alterity “under its thematizing gaze” (159). If “postsecular medita-
tions” is a developing genre of philosophical or theoretical inquiry, then this 
paper aligns itself with such expression. For Matuštík, the term “postsecular” 
does not indicate a thinking “after” secularism; rather, it attends to the coin-
cidence of various religious and secular phenomenon. It is a descriptive term 
open to “diverse phenomena” that includes those edifying and often uncanny 
sources of inspiration for social justice as well as the “myriad phenomena of 
willed human destruction” (Matuštík, 10). In its more edifying expressions, the 
term postsecular indicates a sensibility for what Robert Bringhurst describes as 
the “polyhistorical mind.” In its more invidious expressions of willed human 
destruction, it attests to the genocidal sorrow and transgenerational trauma 
that persists beyond our capacities for representation and memory. Postsecular 
meditations, then, already demand a kind of translation of experience as the 
modality of decolonial justice, which the task of encountering “wisdom in its 
place” requires.
MEDITATION ONE: TRANSLATION AND DECOLONIAL JUSTICE
Situated on Tlingít ancestral territory, the University of Alaska Southeast re-
mains modeled on a colonial model of education that reproduces the sorrows of 
coloniality at the personal, interpersonal, structural and institutional levels. As 
increasing attention is given to the task of decolonizing education and attending 
to the exigencies of restitution in response to the deeply entrenched historical 
violence, the university emerges as a site of instruction on which decoloniza-
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tion, as a translation of experience, might occur. But the task of translation must 
be accounted for in critically nuanced ways so as not to smuggle within its work 
a greater, less visible, form of cultural despair. Toward this end, I identify four 
horizons of translation that must be attended to in order to effectuate decolonial 
justice and encounter Tlingít intellectual authority in the specificity of place on 
its own terms.
The first concern for translation is that already identified by Eric Cheyfitz 
in The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and Colonization from The Tempest to 
Tarzan—that notion of translation from trans latio (across the ocean), which 
bears within it a colonial-anthropological impulse. This notion of translation 
is historically and literarily tone deaf to the qualities of indigenous inspiration 
and intellectual authority. It takes its expression through what Michel Foucault 
calls an “ontology of truth”—that privileging of the ontological that Levinas 
critically exposes and that is derived from a consciousness of seeing, shaped by 
a private ontology of self, as opposed to a “consciousness termed hearing” that 
is irreducibly relational, performative, and storied (Levinas, “Transcendence 
of Words,” 147). This anthropological translation, derived from what Enrique 
Dussel calls a “North Atlantic ontology,” indexes the irreducibly rich kinship 
structures of indigenous oral literatures to structures of truth determined in 
advance by “partisan chronologies and hierarchies” (Bringhurst, 28). This no-
tion of translation is largely the one we are accustomed to, historically, in the 
university. It is a notion of translation that confuses the “universality” of the 
“university” with a more rich sense of what Bringhurst calls the “polyhistorical 
mind.” Translation, as such, is still too beholden to a sense of consciousness as 
an “aiming of thought” (Levinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 160). Trans-
lation, in this sense, only exploits and abuses indigenous oral literary traditions.
A second notion of translation comes from Emmanuel Levinas, who de-
scribes his own project as one of “translating” Judaism into Greek, or Jerusalem 
into Athens. Annette Aronowicz, in her “Translator’s Introduction” to Levinas’s 
Nine Talmudic Readings, offers a description of Levinas’s thinking on the relation 
between the Jewish and the European, or “Greek,” traditions: “For Levinas, the 
rethinking of the relation of Jewish to ‘Greek’ sources would have to include 
the vision of universality, of one humanity in which all related as equals and in 
which all participated responsibly. . . . The difference now was that in order for 
this one humanity to come into being, Western sources of spirituality, Western 
wisdom, would no longer suffice. In order for a genuine human community to 
emerge, it was Jewish wisdom, the Jewish vision of the human being, which must 
be understood and made available to everyone else” (xii–xiii). In terms of think-
ing concretely about the university as a space of translation, the University of 
Alaska Southeast, as an example, must also think through to the limits of West-
ern epistemological, scientific, and philosophical traditions and replace these 
limitations with Tlingít cultural, linguistic, and ethical resources. As Levinas 
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works to translate Judaism into Greek, so too must the “universality” of the uni-
versity be translated into a polyhistorical perspective grounded in indigenous 
inspirations. Such translation necessarily decolonizes.
A third perspective on translation can be culled from Anishinaabe writer 
Gerald Vizenor’s descriptions of a “trickster hermeneutics” from Manifest Man-
ners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance. Here, Vizenor describes the trickster as 
a “translator of creation”:
The trickster is reason and mediation in stories, the original translator of 
tribal encounters; the name is an intimation of transformation, men to 
women, animal to birds, and more than mere causal representation in 
names. Tricksters are the translation of creation; the trickster creates the 
tribe in stories, and pronounces the moment of remembrance as the trace 
of liberation. The animals laughed, birds cried, and there were worried 
hearts over the everlasting humor that would liberate the human mind in 
trickster stories. Trickster stories are the translation of liberation, and the 
shimmer of imagination is the liberation of the last trickster stories. (Mani-
fest Manners, 15)
Importantly, Vizenor opposes “trickster hermeneutics”—as a translation of ex-
perience, creation, and liberation—to the Aristotelian sacralization of the tragic 
over comic literary modalities. Trickster hermeneutics, not unlike Gerald Brun’s 
notion of “allegory” and “midrash,” deals not merely with tropes (trickster as 
trope) but arises from its own economy of signification—one that liberates the 
imagination as a general economy of signification. If we are to think about decolo-
nization as a kind of translation, one that—not unlike Levinas—works to trans-
late European forms of knowledge into indigenous inspirations and intellectual 
authority, we can replace the philosophical (i.e., “Aristotelian”) sacralization of 
the tragic with a “trickster hermeneutics” that liberates the imagination and 
translates this liberation through comic modalities that are not derived from the 
tragic. Quoting Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Vizenor notes that, “While [Aristote-
lian] tragedy does indeed focus on what can go wrong in the actions of the best of 
men, its ethical lessons are not primarily about the place of accident and fortune 
in the unfolding of a human life” (16, emphasis added). In contrast, a “trickster 
hermeneutics,” as translation of creation and liberation, arises from indigenous 
“sources of natural reason and tribal consciousness” rather than “nostalgia or 
liberal melancholy” (Vizenor, 14). Although encountering indigenous wisdom 
in its place necessarily occurs in the wake of unspeakable historical violence, 
Vizenor still insists, “the stories that turn the tribes tragic are not their own 
stories” (16). To think of translation and decolonial justice, then, means that 
proximity to indigenous cultures brings uncanny inspiration to the other side of 
historical and traumatic exhaustion.
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Finally, Sandor Goodhart describes another concern for translation when he 
warns of a “translation” that becomes a “transmuting.” In “Back to the Garden: 
Jewish Hermeneutics, Biblical Reading, PaRDeS, and the Four-Fold”—an essay 
that focuses on Levinas, René Girard, and the historical development of midrash 
and allegory from the late medieval and early modern periods—Goodhart draws 
our attention to economies of signification that smuggle within them econo-
mies of abjection and thus make possible and give alibi to approaches to reading 
that contribute to the staging of what Martin Matuštik will describe, in Radical 
Evil and the Scarcity of Hope, as “historical shapes of human abjection.” In this 
essay, Goodhart quotes a preface to the original King James Version of the Bible 
(KJV), “The Translators to the Readers,” in which the translators make ostensibly 
cordial invitations to the reader by describing the work of translation in decid-
edly hospitable terms: “Translation it is that openeth the window, to let in the 
light; that breaketh the shell, that we may eat the kernel; that putteth aside the 
curtain, that we may look into the most holy place; that removeth the cover of 
the well, that we may come by the water.” (37). As Goodhart notes, “The words 
are richly hospitable. They speak of opening windows, letting in light to shine 
upon the darkness, breaking open the shell so that the kernel may be accessed, 
stripping away the curtain so that the holiest of holies may be revealed” (38). 
However, toward the end of the KJV preface, these gestures of hospitality attrib-
uted to translation are marked by a profound exclusionary gesture whereby the 
translators exclude “wicked Jewes” from the salvation promised to its “gentle 
readers”: “Ye are brought unto fountains of living water which ye digged not; do 
not cast earth into them with the Philistines, neither prefer broken pits before them 
with the wicked Jewes. . . . If light be come into the world, love not darkness more 
than light” (38). The “hospitality” promised of translation in the early part of 
the preface becomes an act of exclusion. “In this instance,” Goodhart observes, 
the “translators” have become “transmuters”—“altering at once the language (or 
letter) in which that exclusionary strategy is deployed (from Hebrew, Greek, and 
Latin to English), and as well its life-giving breath (or spirit)—‘muting’ its pro-
foundly sacrificial strategy in the name of countering that strategy” (39).
From Goodhart’s reading of the KJV translator’s preface, I cull four key 
concerns: First, we can hold out for the possibility of a translation that enacts 
hospitality, gift-giving, and generous receptivity. Second, what we come away 
with, however, is too frequently a sacrificial strategy that reproduces exactly 
what it claims to counter. Third, this act of exclusion, this sacrificial enactment, 
transforms translation into transmuting because its economies of signification 
are already predicated on economies of abjection and exclusion. Thus, the very 
language—indeed, our very relation to the letter of the language—is itself al-
tered (transmuted). The “life-giving breath” or “spirit”—which we can link to 
inspiration and the literalness of respiration as Levinas does—is altered at the 
very level of signification. Fourth, the exclusionary gesture that transmutes our 
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very relation to the letter of the language is itself obscured, or muted. Not only 
does translation transmute our relation to the language through the pressures 
of abjection, but it also obscures, mystifies, and mutes the very enabling of that 
abjection.
If we are to reflect on wisdom in its places, it is imperative to decolonize 
the terms and conditions of that reflection lest we reinscribe the colonialism 
of translation that Cheyfitz warns us about. Translation both requires and en-
ables decolonial justice as colonial projects of translation, carried across the 
latitudes through a “North Atlantic ontology,” smuggle within their work a 
sacrificial cultural logic on which genocide and “historical shapes of human 
abjection” are predicated. As such, it also alters (transmutes) our very relation 
to language itself. Most frequently, this colonial description of language and 
translation is tied to a “representational” way of thinking—as opposed to the 
“prophetic” way of thinking that Goodhart has written extensively about or 
the “diachrony” of a saying (le dire) that Levinas describes—and so it occasions 
an especially invidious kind of coloniality because it simultaneously “mutes” 
the very transmuting of our relation to language.
Here, we can look to the extensive use of boarding schools in Indian 
Country and Lingít Aaní as an example. In terms of colonialism, Native chil-
dren were forced to leave their homes, villages, and culture to attend boarding 
school where they were physically and mentally abused for using their lan-
guage. The common dictum that gave moral justification to these colonial 
institutions of genocide was, “Kill the Indian. Save the Child.” The use of 
boarding schools is clearly an instance of colonialism, but the more subtle and 
persistent expressions of coloniality—as a cultural disturbance that affects 
our very relation to the letter of language—are less explicit. X’unei Lance 
Twitchell, a professor of Tlingít language and culture at the University of 
Alaska Southeast, regularly notes in conversation that, in these boarding 
schools, “they beat our language out of us and replaced it with a language that 
hates us.” It is remarkable to describe English as a language “that hates us.” 
These are, indeed, heavy words. They testify to that quality of transmuting 
that subtly reterritorializes self along the contours of a language spoken 
carelessly, harboring abjection, and they speak to all the sorrows of colonial 
translation when not attended to in their existential, political, cultural, and 
intersubjective relations. Under such conditions, that which is transmuted 
through abjection, along with the very transmuting itself, remains muted, mys-
tified, and pervasive. Revitalizing wisdom in its place and concretely making 
room for indigenous intellectual inspirations and authority must contend 
with the demands and concrete exigencies of translating experience, creation, 
and liberation. Otherwise, such encounters will only ever remain, resolutely, 
an extension of colonial enterprise.
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To reiterate, in order to encounter indigenous wisdom in its place—or to 
resituate the emergence of intelligibility in the specificity of place—a transla-
tion of sorts, not unlike the one that characterizes Levinas’s work, must occur. 
Decolonial translation must (1) work to demystify with sober vigilance the 
economies of abjection smuggled into economies of signification; (2) uncondi-
tion knowledge from what Levinas describes as a consciousness of seeing and 
reorient it toward what he calls a “consciousness termed hearing”; and (3) re-
cover the polyhistorical mind of a “trickster hermeneutics”—as a translation of 
creation and liberation—that enables a rich encounter with story and the deep, 
abiding kinship it supports. In terms of enacting that translation in the critical 
interest of decolonial justice, Levinas offers us a significant starting point when 
he insists, for example, that the starting point of phenomenology is neither 
intentionality nor apprehension but inspiration. Indigenous inspirations, I ar-
gue, are better registered within an “inspired” phenomenology attuned not to 
a consciousness of seeing, indexed to an ontology of truth and reducible to the 
ratio of rationality, but to a consciousness of hearing, inspired by an ontology of 
story and occasioned through revelation, face, and an intuition for what “all 
my relations” invokes.
Tlingít elder, Jessie Dalton, T’akdeintaan clan mother, explains in her 
speech for the removal of grief cited in an epigraph for this paper: “Yes, They 
are revealing their faces.”
MEDITATION TWO: TOWARD AN INSPIRED ECO-PHENOMENOLOGY
In Being and Place Among the Tlingít, Thomas Thornton offers one approach to 
reading Jessie Dalton’s “Speech for the Removal of Grief” that helps us take up 
a Levinasian “inspired eco-phenomenology” while attending to the difficulties 
and exigencies of translation in the service of decolonization. In what follows, 
I make two brief gestures before addressing what I consider to be a history of an 
error in reading Levinas in an eco-phenomenological context. The first gesture 
examines Jessie Dalton’s speech as an example of translation as hospitality and 
respect; the second gesture reads this hospitality in terms of Nelson Maldonado-
Torres’s notion of decolonization as a gift, as a restoration of “the logics of the 
gift through a decolonial politics of receptive generosity” (261).
Translation as Hospitality Otherwise than Transmuting
In Being and Place Among the Tlingít, Tom Thornton quotes Richard and Nora 
Dauenhauer’s Haa Tuwunáagu Yis, for Healing Our Spirit at length, which is 
worth including here:
An orator such as Jessie Dalton is selected to speak because of his or her sen-
sitivity, and the orator is compared in Tlingít to someone who brings a very 
long pole into a house. In handling words, as in handling a pole, a speaker 
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must be careful not to strike or hit anyone’s face, or to break anything by ac-
cident. Referring to oratory during an interview, her own words were, “It is 
difficult to speak to someone who is respected. It is very difficult.” Delivered 
carelessly, words can be dangerous and detrimental. But when delivered 
carefully, oratory can be a soothing medicine, a healing power and balm 
to one who is in pain. It can give spiritual strength. In Tlingít one says, kaa 
toowú kei altseench, “people gain spiritual strength from it,” or toowú latseen 
kaa jeex atee, “it gives strength to the spirit.” The effect of words in a good 
speech is described as yándei kdusyaa yáx yatee du yoo x’atángi, “his words 
were like cloth being gently spread out on a flat service.” (180)
Thornton quotes the Dauenhauers here in a chapter on “Ritual as Emplace-
ment,” which speaks to the need for encountering wisdom in its place with 
careful attention to the qualities of language born of an ontology of story, one 
that demystifies sacrificial gestures smuggled within economies of signification 
predicated on abjection.
It is worth highlighting, then, three qualities of Jessie Dalton’s speech that 
are important to articulating translation as a decolonial practice that helps 
stage an encounter with Levinas through what I am describing as “indigenous 
inspirations”: (1) It is expressly concerned not to occasion the kind of exclu-
sionary gesture we witness in the translator’s preface to the KJV; (2) by ritually 
remaining vigilant to such concerns—which is to say, by preserving hospitality 
and respect as the very relation to the language (against transmuting)—it also 
preserves what Goodhart describes as the “life-giving breath (or spirit)” of the 
language; and (3) it stages what I will call an “inspired” relation to language 
that, in turn, occasions justice inspired by what Maldonado-Torres will call a 
“decolonial love” (260). Importantly, Jessie Dalton’s speech not only delivers 
profound content of healing words that address grief, but they also deliver 
within that content the very structure of the relations upon which such wis-
dom is articulated. As Goodhart’s appeal to the topology of the möbius strip 
in literary imaginations attests, the content (contained) is carried by the struc-
ture, but it is also the case that the structure (container) is borne by and within 
the content (contained). Here, I appeal to postsecular sensibilities for staging 
a translation beyond transmuting. Levinas will invoke a “difficult freedom” 
in ways not unlike Jessie Dalton who invokes a “difficult speech” before the 
respected elders: “It is difficult to speak to someone who is respected. It is very 
difficult.” In this sense, we might speak of decolonial translation as a “difficult 
translation.”
Decolonization as Gift
Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s essay, “On the Coloniality of Being”—which ar-
ticulates the staging ground upon which his book Against War: Views from the 
Underside of Modernity is built—offers a sustained meditation on the contribu-
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tions of Levinas toward decolonial justice, which requires and enacts the kind 
of decolonial translation of experience I’ve adumbrated here. In the essay, 
Maldonado-Torres invokes Fanon’s damné as “the subject that emerges in a 
world marked by the coloniality of Being” (257). The figure of the damné is both 
“concrete being” and “a transcendental concept,” which Maldonado-Torres 
describes by appeal to Emile Benveniste who shows “that the term damné is 
etymologically related to the concept of donner, which means, to give” (258). 
In the context of coloniality, the damné “is a subject from whom the capacity 
to have and to give have been taken away” (258). What Maldonado-Torres calls 
“the coloniality of being,” which is one dimension of coloniality entwined 
with the coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of power, is that dy-
namic “that aims to obliterate—in its literal sense of doing away completely 
so as to leave no trace—gift-giving and generous reception as a fundamental 
character of being-in-the-world” (258), which for Levinas are requisite to the 
constitution of the self. In a colonial context, the gift-giving capacity of in-
digenous intellectual authority is both transmuted and muted. Not only are 
indigenous voices silenced or marginalized, but such silencing radically de-
forms the cultures of usurpation. On Lingít Aaní, decolonial justice must begin 
by encountering wisdom in its place, but the cultures of usurpation and 
domination must find corrective in the receptivity of that historically muted 
gift-giving capacity of indigenous culture and language. Decolonization is a 
gift not so much for the victims of coloniality but for its perpetrators. What 
Maldonado-Torres calls “generous reception” requires a two-fold staging: It 
must occur with and through the process of decolonial translation—which, in 
turn, occasions uncanny inspirations for recuperative justice.
Returning, again, to Jessie Dalton’s “Speech for the Removal of Grief,” 
we can witness such gift-giving capacity in both content and structure. Tom 
Thornton notes that, “[b]ecause of the profound feelings of sadness they evoke, 
[such] songs are typically only voiced on ‘heavy’ occasions, such as a funeral 
or memorial potlatch. When they are sung, their geographic context is always 
emphasized” (109). He cites Amy Marvin—clan mother (Naa Tláa) of the Choo-
kaneidí, who observes that “the sorrowful songs are also a source of strength—a 
gift.” Thornton continues: “In this way, the ancestor’s trails of inhabitation, 
suffering, and fortitude and the continuing presence of their spirits on the 
land serve to orient and inspire (literally to breathe spirit into) contemporary 
Tlingíts” (109). Encountering wisdom in its place requires decolonial transla-
tion as hospitality and a receptivity to the gift-giving capacity of indigenous 
inspirations muted by a persistent coloniality—a coloniality entrenched not 
only in the conspicuous vestiges of colonialism but also in the very relation to 
the letter of language itself.
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Levinas and Eco-Phenomenology: From Intentionality to Inspiration
With regard to the concern for resituating the emergence of intelligibility in the 
specificity of place, I have first argued that we need to decolonize an entrenched 
coloniality by adopting a concern for decolonization as a kind of translation. 
From this point of view, we see that cultures of usurpation cannot effect this 
translation on its own and that it must discover a generous receptivity to the 
historically muted gift-giving capacities of colonized indigenous peoples. In 
this section, I want to account for ethical resources available within European 
forms of philosophy insofar as they have already been translated by Levinas. 
In other words, in this section, I want to assess Levinasian contributions to an 
internal critique of coloniality by examining the limits of Levinas’s early recep-
tion in eco-phenomenology. At least in its early articulations, Levinas did not 
receive a warm welcome to eco-phenomenology, which is surprising. Without 
resorting to polemical exegesis, I would like to address the persistence of what I 
consider an error in thinking about Levinasian contributions to eco-phenome-
nology as an intrigue for decolonial justice.
For Emmanuel Levinas, the first movement of phenomenology is neither 
intentionality nor apprehension—but inspiration. Inspiration is linked to the 
literalness of respiration, whereby, as Levinas writes in Otherwise Than Being, the 
body is “the distinctive in-oneself of the contraction of ipseity and its breakup.” 
He writes: “This contraction [of respiration] is not an impossibility to forget one-
self, to detach oneself from oneself, in the concern for oneself. It is a recurrence 
to oneself out of an irrecusable exigency of the other, a duty overflowing my 
being, a duty becoming a debt and an extreme passivity prior to the tranquility, 
still quite relative, in the inertia and materiality of things at rest” (109). In his 
“translator’s preface” to Otherwise Than Being, Alphonso Lingis distinguishes 
this “openness upon the air” of Levinas’s inspiration against Heidegger’s think-
ing of existence as being in an openness. To find oneself in the openness of a 
clearing in the forest is to find oneself already in the space of light, seeking illu-
mination as the primary model of thinking—and thus of sociality. For Levinas, 
there is always something prior to the contours of openness marked out by 
illumination. Prior to space filled with light, there is space filled with air.
To the extent that Heidegger’s thinking of openness, in the phenom-
enological dimensions of building dwelling thinking, establishes an historically 
and philosophically important starting point for much eco-phenomenology, 
Levinas’s description of inspiration qua respiration invokes, within the lived 
corporeality of the phenomenological, an ethical experience contrary to that 
established on the basis of “intentionality, representational activity, freedom 
and will” (53). As James Hatley and others have noted, Levinas refuses to estab-
lish a transcendental foundation for ethical experience derived from my own 
intentionality, interiority, freedom, or will. Rather, I am taught the significance 
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of the ethical through the saying (le dire) of the other individual—which is to say, 
through the mouth, through a hearing and an exposure to the other for which 
“no slipping away is possible.” A Levinasian re-evaluation of the starting point 
of eco-phenomenology thus opens an intrigue for recuperative justice that, like 
the movement of ipseity linked to the literalness of respiration, provokes a mode 
of revelation as a “for-the-other” “despite oneself,” which expresses the deep 
relationality of a lived corporeality situated by a “fundamental historicity” (as 
diachrony or ancestry). Nevertheless, Levinas’s influence on eco-phenomenol-
ogy remains undeveloped insofar as persistence for intentional consciousness 
still seems to organize many eco-phenomenological approaches. Following 
Levinas, I argue that an inspired eco-phenomenology restores an ethical gravity 
of the other-than-human in ways beyond what intentional consciousness can 
anticipate.
The Persistence of Intentionality in Eco-Phenomenology
Let’s begin with a cursory look at David Wood’s essay—“What is Eco-Phenom-
enology?”—that concludes the Eco-Phenomenology reader edited by Charles 
Brown and Ted Toadvine. In his essay, Wood opens by expressing phenom-
enology’s “need for a rapprochement with Naturalism.” Noting that Husserl 
started phenomenology as a project to “[save] humanity from the threat of a 
purely naturalistic view of things, which ultimately treats everything—including 
humans—as reducible to the operation of causal laws” (211), Wood ultimately 
argues that Husserl’s phenomenological project is one that critiques naïve 
naturalism, predicated on naïve sense of causality, but that a rapprochement 
between phenomenology and naturalism can occur by invigorating and ex-
panding phenomenology’s descriptive techniques in order to address “how 
living creatures have acquired the functionally integrated and environmen-
tally responsive bodies that they do indeed possess, and perhaps explain how 
it is that multiple complex individual living beings developed in the first place, 
for example, through the incorporation into a single ‘body’ of what began as a 
group of simpler symbiotically related organisms” (212). Wood describes this 
kind of naturalism as “evolutionary naturalism,” which—by phenomeno-
logically inquiring at this level of “deep causality”—becomes the ground upon 
which we can, as he writes, “facilitate an engagement between phenomenology 
and naturalism” (212).
Presumably, Wood’s project attempts not so much to restore but to recover 
a quality of relating that Husserl brackets in, for instance, Cartesian Meditations 
where the possibility of intersubjective relations is put at risk by the positing 
of monadic subjectivity. Developing such an engagement between naturalism 
and phenomenology, as such, transforms not only our understanding of natu-
ralism, but the possibilities of phenomenology itself. As Wood notes,
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If an eco-phenomenology could give us better access to nature than that 
represented by the naturalism which phenomenology was created to resist, 
by supplementing intentionality structurally with non- or preintentional 
characteristics of nature, would not eco-phenomenology be the future of a 
phenomenology, one which has purged itself of its opposition to nature? 
(212)
He goes on to argue that “[recovering] an engagement with the Sache selbst [the 
things themselves] is not at all to return to some pure presence, it is rather to 
return to a world in which the relation between present experience and the 
complexity of what is being experienced has always been deeply complex and 
stratified. Eco-phenomenology is the pursuit of the relationalities of worldly engage-
ment, both human and those of other creatures” (213, emphasis added). Accord-
ingly, then, phenomenology is transformed into eco-phenomenology as the 
concept of “intentionality” is invigorated beyond the bracketing of naïve natu-
ralism and attunes itself with evolutionary naturalism in order to bring us “into 
intimate sensuous relation with the complex things of this world” (211).
The problem with Wood’s staging of the phenomenological within eco-
phenomenology, as I see it, is that it is still too beholden to the structures of 
intentionality that Levinas critiques. Is it not the case that Wood recreates the 
move from Husserl to Heidegger but somehow misses out on the concerns of 
totality that Levinas opens? In the attempt to stage eco-phenomenology as the 
“pursuit of relationalities of worldly engagement, both human and those of 
other creatures”—a project adapted by other eco-phenomenological texts, all 
of which respectfully seek non-hierarchal relational status between the human 
and the other-than-human—Wood reverts to the structures of intentionality 
that gather the other-than-human into, precisely, the relation of sameness that 
Levinas exposes. Noting that “intentionality” is a “key concept in phenomenol-
ogy”—Wood describes the actions of intentionality as structured reflections, 
noting that it “fills out what is specific about perceptual consciousness, rather 
than interrupting or contesting the intentional stance.” Such language is the 
inverse of a Levinasian phenomenology for which inspiration precedes intention-
ality in a way that does, in fact, interrupt the intentional stance. Uninterrupted 
intentionality not only “fills out” what is specific about perceptual conscious-
ness, but it also seizes, grasps, and subjugates even as it ostensibly orients itself 
with care.
The purpose of this critical exposition of David Wood’s starting point is 
not necessarily to engage in polemics but to identify a tendency within phe-
nomenology that does not sufficiently account for the persistence of inten-
tionality that Levinas exposes as an aiming of thought—of the recuperation 
of the other into the sameness of intentional consciousness. For one, such 
phenomenological projects are still too beholden to vision, of seeing, as the 
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horizon of inquiry—a point that Levinas subverts by calling attention to a hear-
ing that precedes vision, which discovers inspiration before and beyond Husserlian 
intentionality or Heideggerian apprehension. Second, there is a modality of 
time that one misses, or is altogether tone deaf to, when beginning from inten-
tionality—viz., what Levinas calls revelation. To be sure, Wood’s essay gestures 
towards these concerns: For example, in his descriptions of the (com)plexity 
of time, he identifies four strands—the invisibility of time, the celebration of 
finitude, the coordination of rhythms, and the interruption and breakdown of 
temporal horizons—as ways that enrich temporal experience. And, of course, 
by emphasizing “the invisibility of time” and “the interruption of temporal 
horizons,” Wood guards against collapsing into what he calls a “premature 
holism, an over-enthusiastic drive to integration” (what Levinas calls totality). 
Nevertheless, despite these safeguards, privileging an invisible at the heart of 
the visible still prioritizes models of in/visibility as the governing modality be-
hind a phenomenology of perception. The question, then, is whether or not 
the continued privileging of the visible betrays the concern against totality, or 
premature holism, that Wood himself hopes to disrupt. Indeed, Wood notes 
that his account “occupies what I have called a middle ground overlapping the 
space of intentionality” (217, emphasis added). The interruption of temporal 
horizons, it turns out, not only preserves intentional structure but also secures 
it against its own interruption. Insofar as intentionality is preserved in its privi-
leged sense—an intentionality secured by the guarantee of visibility—the very 
phenomenological attempt to apprehend “the relations of worldly engagement, 
both human and those of other creatures,” encumbers such relation in the very 
totality that it hopes to abandon.
Phenomenology Beyond the Philosophical
Following this cursory reading of Wood’s starting point of intentionality, I 
would like also to look to a critique of Levinas delivered by Ted Toadvine in an 
essay titled “In Wildness is the Refusal of the World,” which he delivered in 
1998 at SPEP as a commentary on Gerald Bruns’s book, Maurice Blanchot: The 
Refusal of Philosophy. In this presentation, Toadvine, reiterating Bruns, sug-
gests that a break occurred between Blanchot and Levinas, arguing that Blan-
chot moves beyond philosophy while Levinas—“despite [his] proximity” to 
Blanchot—“remains a philosopher.” This is a problematic claim that one can 
only make by neglecting a full half of Levinas’s authorship, which includes his 
Talmudic readings. Despite whatever differences developed between Blanchot 
and Levinas—and, certainly, Blanchot worked in a way otherwise than philoso-
phy—it is less accurate to say that Levinas “remains a philosopher” than to say 
that he persists in philosophy, in part because that was his announced project: 
to translate Judaism into Greek. But we cannot overlook the persistent otherwise 
than philosophizing at the heart of Levinas’s own work, which bears a profound 
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literary, storied (midrashic) dimension that much of modern philosophy is 
tone deaf to. Both Blanchot and Levinas, together, deliver persistent critiques 
of the limits of the philosophical and thus of ontological phenomenology. This 
is important to note in advance because I will return to a problematic claim that 
Toadvine makes about Levinas’s relation with the “sounds of nature”—or, as he 
notes quoting Celan, “the language of ‘stones and stars’” (Toadvine, 9).
For both Blanchot and Levinas, if philosophy—broadly speaking—priori-
tizes visibility and the field of sight, the literary prioritizes a hearing (a noise) 
that interrupts the stability of the visible—a hearing that comes before and 
goes beyond the privilege of sight. For Blanchot, philosophy is the language 
of vision, of concept (Begriff), and Levinas shares Blanchot’s critique of the 
panoramic of existence. When, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas famously de-
scribes ethics as “an optics,” he qualifies optics in terms of a hearing—in terms 
of exteriority and language—rather than as a seeing: “[E]thics is an optics,” he 
writes, “[b]ut it is a ‘vision’ without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing 
objectifying virtues of vision, a relation or an intentionality of a wholly different 
type” (23, see also 29). Gerald Bruns, writing on Blanchot, reiterates this point, 
noting emphatically, “Philosophy has no place for sound. Sound is foreign. It is 
always outside the world, threatening to invade it, like anarchy” (Refusal 107).
Nowhere is this relation of sound scandalizing the synoptic and totalizing 
virtues of vision more emphatically expressed than in Levinas’s essay, “The 
Transcendence of Words.” It is also the essay that Toadvine cites to stage his cri-
tique of Levinas, which requires us to examine the offending passage. Exploiting 
the notion of an emphatic “break” between Blanchot and Levinas with regard 
to the origins of responsibility, Toadvine—who rightfully notes that “Levinas 
rejects the ‘impersonal neutrality’ of the Il y a as a possible basis for responsibil-
ity”—insists, “While Blanchot, following Celan, may listen for the language ‘of 
stones and stars,’ to the ears of Levinas ‘[t]he sounds and noise of nature are 
failed words. To really hear a sound we need to hear a word. Pure sound is the 
word.” From this passage, originally quoted by Bruns, Toadvine draws a hasty 
conclusion—viz., that, for Levinas, “Nature does not speak, but is rather a 
theme of speech.” He further emphasizes, “Here we find Levinas’s characteristic 
hierarchization of ethical (i.e., human) language over the language of things, as 
well as the inevitable turn toward the intelligible, i.e., philosophy. Unsettled by 
the sound of the Il y a, Levinas ‘cannot abandon philosophy, that is, cannot give 
up the discourse of concepts and definition’” (Toadvine, 114). This is a serious 
critique, but it’s entirely premature if not carefully qualified. In my concern for 
encountering Levinas through indigenous inspirations, as a way of translating 
experience in a decolonial enterprise, I will turn briefly to the charge that Levinas 
characteristically hierarchizes ethical—specifically human—language over the 
language of things, or the other-than-human.
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It is worth noting, with special attention to translation, that Toadvine—in 
following Bruns—takes up Seán Hand’s translation of “The Transcendence of 
Words” in which we read, “The sounds and noises of nature are failed words” 
(148). A better translation of this passage comes from Michael B. Smith, who 
translates the sentence as, “The sounds and noises of nature are words that disap-
point us” (148). Here is Smith’s translation of the passage in its entirety:
There is in fact in sound—and in consciousness understood as hearing—
a shattering of the always complete world of vision and art. Sound is all 
repercussion, outburst, scandal. While in vision a form espouses a content 
and soothes it, sound is like the sensible quality overflowing its limits, 
the incapacity of form to hold its content—a true rent in the fabric of the 
world—that by which the world that is here prolongs a dimension incon-
vertible into vision. It is thus that the sound is symbol par excellence—a 
reaching beyond the given. If, however, sound can appear as a phenom-
enon, as here, it is because its function of transcendence only asserts itself 
in the verbal sound. The sounds and noises of nature are words that disap-
point us. To really hear a sound is to hear a word. Pure sound is the word. 
(147–148)
What does this mean? I want to suggest that we must read this passage in the 
context of Levinas’s insistence on inspiration as the starting point for phenom-
enology—linked to the literalness of respiration for which “the body” is not 
just “an image or a figure here.” Rather, the literalness of respiration is to be “in 
one’s skin”:
The expression “in one’s skin” is not a metaphor for the in-itself; it refers to 
a recurrence in the dead time or the meanwhile which separates inspiration 
and expiration, the diastole and systole of the heart beating dully against 
the walls of one’s skin. The body is not only an image or figure here; it is 
the distinctive in-oneself of the contraction of ipseity and its breakup. This 
contraction is not an impossibility to forget oneself, to detach oneself from 
oneself, in the concern for oneself. It is a recurrence to oneself out of an irre-
cusable exigency of the other, a duty overflowing my being, a duty becoming 
a debt and an extreme passivity prior to the tranquility, still quite relative, in 
the inertia and materiality of things at rest” (Otherwise Than Being 109).
For Levinas, the “sounds and noises of nature” disappoint because they are 
soundings of this tranquility, this inertia and materiality of things at rest. They 
are not “failed words,” as Hand translates, but “words that disappoint,” as 
Smith translates, because this tranquility is not passive enough—which is to say, 
they do not undergo the radical passivity of revelation, which Levinas links to 
inspiration. Such revelation, as Levinas is fond of describing, is born of a radical 
passivity—a passivity more passive than the opposite of action.
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For Levinas, in “The Transcendence of Words,” our lived relations with the 
world, our embodiment, our proximity with the other is always already sto-
ried—even before the tranquility of the “sounds and noises of nature.” But the 
transcendence of words also means this: “[I]n social relations the real presence 
of the other is important; but above all it means that this presence, far from sig-
nifying pure and simple coexistence with me, or expressing itself through the 
romantic metaphor of ‘living presence,’ is fulfilled in the act of hearing” (148). 
This is radical, and Bruns picks up on what is unique here to Levinas: It’s not that 
sound is the medium of utterances; it’s that utterances become the medium of sound 
itself (107). The sounds and noises of nature disappoint when they are not heard 
from the point of view of the utterance, when they remain mired in the tran-
quility and materiality of things at rest, registered only in the medium of sound 
with all its aesthetic self-sufficiency. In contrast, it is the social relation—the 
irreducible kinship relation expressed by “all my relations”—the utterance itself 
of ancestry and place by which the noise and sounds of nature are at last heard 
through an inspired eco-phenomenology. This does not mean that Levinas 
characteristically hierarchizes “ethical (i.e., human) language over the lan-
guage of things” as Toadvine claims, nor does it mean that the sounds of nature 
are mere “themes” of human speech. Rather, it means that “becoming human” 
requires this inspiration, this revelation of responsiveness to the transcendence 
of words that is neither entirely reducible to flesh—and thus, as Levinas writes, 
“assures a presence among us” (148)—nor to the aesthetic self-sufficiency of the 
inertia and materiality of things at rest.
In other words, I am not convinced that we ought to conflate “the ethi-
cal” with “the human” in the way that Toadvine suggests Levinas does. Nor 
is it guaranteed that a thinking of the human and other-than-human relation 
from the point of view of what it means to become human entails that this rela-
tionship will be one of hierarchy and domination as opposed to hospitality and 
respect. Still, if we are to encounter Levinas through indigenous inspirations in 
working toward decolonial justice, this deliberation occasions an opportunity 
for thinking about Levinas’s contributions to eco-phenomenology in nuanced 
ways. Here, for example, I am thinking about Joy Harjo’s poem, “Protocol,” 
from How We Became Human. In this poem she writes,
I do not know your language though I hear the breaking of waves through 
the vowels. (169)
Is this not exactly what Levinas seems to articulate—“as if utterances were 
the medium of sound” (Bruns, 107)? And this is doubly striking: To encoun-
ter Tlingít wisdom in this place, one cannot do it apart from the language. At 
some point, the translation remains impossible. One must learn the language. 
X’unei Lance Twitchell repeatedly reminds us that if one is fluent in Tlingít, one 
can always survive on the land because the language is born of the land. But 
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decolonial justice nevertheless requires of us a kind of translation of sorts—like 
the one that characterizes Levinas’s own project, or the trickster hermeneutics 
of Vizenor. “I do not know your language though I hear the breaking of waves 
through the vowels.” It is this rich source of inspiration attending to the “tran-
scendence of words” that first struck me as I started learning Tlingít because 
the first thing you learn when studying Tlingít, at least at the university, are the 
eight vowels. The sounds and noises of nature, on Lingít Aaní, in this rich coastal 
rainforest, necessarily disappoint when they are reduced only to the medium of 
sound without a respect and responsiveness to the utterances of ancestry that 
make that sound legible.
I suspect that the impatience with which Levinas has been attended to 
while thinking through his contributions to eco-phenomenology is due to the 
persistence of intentionality in eco-phenomenology. Unfortunately, the notion 
that Levinas cannot account for the ethical gravity of the other-than-human 
stubbornly endures even in the works of those who enthusiastically take him 
up for eco-phenomenology. For example, there is an interview with Levinas to 
which many eco-phenomenologists appeal in which Levinas is asked, “Does a 
snake have a face?” And Levinas responds, “I don’t know if a snake has a face. 
I can’t answer that question.” Responses to Levinas’s lack of a response vary: 
Some eco-phenomenologists cite Levinas’s lack of response as evidence that 
he hierarchizes the human over the other-than-human, refusing to grant the 
other-than-human an “ethical gravity.” Others, like Christian Diehm in the 
Eco-Phenomenology reader, attempt to justify Levinas’s lack of response by noting 
that, at least, he does not reply in the negative. These responses, I want to sug-
gest (as varied as they are) miss something crucial about Levinas’s notion of 
inspiration and the priority he gives to the transcendence of words.
In Otherwise Than Being, as well as in some of his non-philosophical texts, 
Levinas links inspiration to revelation. The transcendence of words, as revela-
tion, opens an altogether different modality of time that even David Wood, 
in his emphasis on the four strands of time, fails to account for. It is the dia-
chronic. It is “fundamental historicity.” It is revelation, teaching. We can even 
say, it is ancestry. The revelation of the face of the other individual is expressed 
in the transcendence of words that is embodied but not reducible to flesh. How 
is this possible? Because the transcendence of words, revelation, more exterior 
than any exteriority of being, “does not come to pass save through the subject 
that confesses or contests it” (156). Here, Levinas writes, “there is an inversion 
of order: the revelation is made by him that receives it, by the inspired subject 
whose inspiration, alterity in the same, is the subjectivity or psyche of the sub-
ject” (156). In other words, my subjectivity is constituted by (subjected to) my 
becoming inspired, by revelation, which bears with it a fundamentally different 
experience of time than the tranquility in the inertia and materiality of things 
at rest. To respond with, “I don’t know if a snake has a face”—then—is not to 
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hierarchize the human over the other-than-human in the reductive speciesism 
Levinas’s critics want to attribute to him; rather, it’s to say, I don’t know if a 
snake (or even stones or streams) experiences revelation and inspiration in this 
way that constitutes my humanity. To become human, however, is to take up 
this responsiveness.
EPILOGUE: “KUNÁX LINGÍT HAA WUSTEE”
In May 2012, at the University of Alaska Southeast, our student commence-
ment speaker was a Tlingít student named Crystal Rogers. From the podium, 
she spoke to her peers and faculty in Tlingít. She noted, in particular, that the 
word “Lingít” means “human being,” and she announced that she wanted to 
talk about “Lingít tundataani” (Tlingít thinking). In describing the qualities 
of Lingít tundataani, she invoked two important phrases: The first is “Tlagu 
kwáanx’ i yán”—or, the “ancient ones” whose lives, she noted, “were more dif-
ficult than we can imagine, but figured out how to survive in the world be-
cause they figured out how to rely on each other, how to be responsible for 
each other.” The second phrase she invoked is “Wooch yax yadáal”—which, 
Crystal described, “is the phrase used when talking about “speech that is 
heavy”: She said, “It is a recognition of all the things, all the circumstances, 
that makes words heavy. All the things that one endures, that one’s ancestors 
endured—the burdens carried, the hardships, and the understanding that, de-
spite whatever endurance, we don’t make it by ourselves.” We are reminded 
of Jessie Dalton’s speech for which these two qualities of Lingít tundataani are 
performed. It is these qualities of “Tlingít thinking” (Lingít tundataani) Crystal 
told us, that mark the difference between simply “being human”—which is 
automatic—and being “truly human,” or, Kunáx Lingít haa wustee (which trans-
lates as, “We really have become human beings”). It’s in this sense of “Tlingít 
thinking” that I want to suggest we read Levinas’s relation of the human and 
the other-than-human—not as pushing a hierarchical superiority of human 
over the other-than-human, not as reducing the sounds of nature to themes of 
human speech, and not as denying the other-than-human an ethical gravity of 
its own. Rather, in our inspiration, we receive a revelation not just as gift but as 
the very conditions of giving. It comes to us from the transcendence of words, 
from the heaviness of words. It does not divorce us of our relations. Rather, it 
restores them in ethical complexity—invoked by “all my relations” as an infin-
ity within the finite.
With Lingít tundataani, we witness a way of becoming human, truly human, 
in ways irreducible to experiencing human and other-than-human relations in 
opposition to one another. The relation is shaped by a diachrony, a fundamental 
historicity responsive to the words of ancestry. In this sense, adopting a Levi-
nasian “inspired” eco-phenomenology helps us take up the task of translation 
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in service of decolonization. For Levinas, we find ourselves already responsible 
for healing the wounds of historical violence prior to our deliberation and prior 
to hearing the terms of what that responsibility entails. As he writes in “The 
Temptation of Temptations,” we are obligated to a doing prior to a hearing—but 
he qualifies this by noting, alternatively, that only in our doing does the radical 
hearing become possible. It’s not just that we are committed to a doing prior to a 
hearing but that we are committed to a doing in order to hear. To become human, 
to become Tlingít, means to take up our responsibility inspired by the voices 
of ancestry made legible through the language and the sounds of nature. To 
become human means becoming responsible in a rich kinship of human and 
other-than-human relations.
In the last instance, however, we will forever remain tone deaf to wisdom 
in its place if we do not commit ourselves to the study of indigenous languages 
in those places.
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